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Law Journal of the National Academy of Internal Affairs

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  • Volume 16, No. 3, 2026

  • FIMI as a sui generis composite offence: a comparative analysis of legal countermeasures in Ukraine, Romania and Moldova in the context of the Defence of Democracy Package

  • Received 14.06.2026,
  • Revised 01.09.2026,
  • Accepted 29.09.2026
  • Published 01.10.2026
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Volume 16, No. 3, 2026
  • Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference; composite offence; comparative law; lex specialis; hybrid threats
  • https://doi.org/10.63341/naia-chasopis/3.2026.110
  • Pages 110-118

Contemporary operations involving foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) are geared towards exploiting the threshold restrictions and jurisdictional limits of legal regimes, which highlights the relevance of a systematic study of the grounds and mechanisms of legal liability for their commission. The aim of this article was to examine the structural deficit in legal liability for acts of FIMI across three jurisdictions – Ukraine, Romania and Moldova – and to justify the need for a conceptual re-examination of FIMI as a composite offence sui generis. The study employs a comparative legal method and a doctrinal analysis of the existing legal systems. The article also examined the constituent elements of FIMI in relation to the existing legal provisions in each of the aforementioned jurisdictions. The central argument was that the objective aspect of “Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference” constitutively encompasses elements of criminal, administrative, electoral and media law, none of which, taken in isolation, provides a sufficient basis for prosecution or effective deterrence. Despite the vast differences between them – in terms of legal tradition, degree of European integration and security context – all three systems exhibit an identical structural gap: fragmented, sector-specific mechanisms that are incapable of addressing coordinated FIMI campaigns as a single legally significant act. Such cross-jurisdictional convergence indicates that the shortfall is systemic rather than nation-specific and has a direct impact, in particular, on discussions regarding the Defence of Democracy Package within EU institutions. This article proposed a model of a composite offence as a legally operational response to the question of the necessity of lex specialis and sets out recommendations regarding the regulatory architecture required for an effective response to FIMI, which may serve as a practical guide for EU legislators and institutions in the process of implementing the Defence of Democracy Package

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